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Topics and Background 
John F. Kennedy Space Center ------------------
• Major Topics 
- COPV safety documentation (only Leak Before Burst (LBB} 
failure mode vs. current COPV failure modes/hazard 
causes} 
- Brief overview of the KSC Cryogenic Composite Tank 
Rupture Incident 
- KSC COPV ground processing hazards 
• How they were managed for the Shuttle Program 
• How they are being controlled for the International Space Station (ISS) 
Program 
NASA, Air Force , and industry standards for composite 
pressure vessels 
-
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NASA Safety Documentation of COPY risks 
and LBB 
John F. Kennedy Space Center --------------------- -
• 
• 
• 
• 
Safety documentation for Shuttle and International Space Station originally 
stated COPVs were "designed to have a leak before burst failure mode". 
- The safety documentation did not address other possible COPV failure 
modes. COPV burst due to stress rupture or impact damage of the 
composite was not addressed 
Per AIAA S-081, Leak-Before-Burst (LBB) is a design approach in which pre-
existing flaws in the metallic liner may grow through the liner and result in 
pressure-relieving leakage rather than burst or rupture 
- LBB does not apply to the composite overwrap. 
Following a NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) review that showed a 
significant risk of COPV composite stress rupture, the Shuttle program 
updated their flight COPV Hazard Reports and Clls to address COPV stress 
rupture. 
Shuttle Hazard Report "Stress Rupture of an Orbiter ECLSS, OMS/RCS, or MPS 
Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel (COPV) durin~ Ground Processing" 
documented the COPV ground processing risks, mitigations, and controls. 
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COPV Failure Modes 
John F. Kennedy Space Center ----------------------
• To correct this for ISS COPVs, Scott Forth/ NASA Pressure Vessel & Fracture Control Technical 
Monitor, issued Technical Memo ES4-08-043 Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel (COPV) 
Risks which states: 
"Failure of a COPV may be catastrophic, leading to loss of the vehicle, ground personnel, or crew, 
and is therefore fracture critical." 
• The memo identified four failure modes associated with COPVs: 
- Burst from over-pressurization 
• Operationally controlled 
- Fatigue failure of the metallic liner 
• Test data shows this risk to be low for KSC operations for most ISS COPVs. 
• This risk may be higher for NORS COPVs due to lnconel welded liner. 
- Burst resulting from damage to the metallic or composite 
• Failure of the COPV from damage to the composite is mitigated by the Damage Control Plan and damage 
tolerance testing. 
- Stress rupture of the composite overwrap 
• To date, the composite stress rupture failure mode of the ISS COPVs has not been adequately mitigated. 
COPV stress rupture is a sudden failure mode that can occur at normal operating pressures and 
temperatures, while at stress levels below ultimate strength. It can produce significant overpressure/ blast 
wave and fragmentation/shrapnel. 
-
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Cryogenic Composite Tank Rupture Incident at KSC 
John F. Kennedy Space Center -
• On December 23, 2008 a composite pressure vessel (no liner) burst during pressure ng 
while filled with LN2 (-900 gal.) and pressurized with GN2. The test team expected a leak· 
before-burst failure and failed to take into account additional energy potential including 
BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion). 
• The test team thought they were protected by plywood barriers and a roll-up door. However 
a high velocity jet of LN2 impacted and opened the door, directly contacting 4 team 
members and filling the room with N2. Several team members received mild cryo burns, one 
member received a cracked rib, 2nd degree cryo burns and other injuries. The test team was 
fortunate, they could have suffered much worse consequences. 
Test Unit Plywood Protective 
Barrier Under Construction 
5 
Area surrounding test unit following tank rupture. Test 
team location was behind roll-up door at top of image. 
Cryo Tank Pre-Test Set-up 
John F. Kennedy Space Center -------------------------- -
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Post-Rupture 
John F. Kennedy Space Center ------------------------ -
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I CTL Exterior 
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Cryo Tank 
John F. Kennedy Space Center --------------------------- -
Flpn 2-2. Compo ft~ T.ak ta apport Structure 
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Cryogenic Composite Tank Rupture 
John F. Kennedy Space Center -------------------
Mishap Investigation Report Findings: 
• The pretest analysis was in error regarding the total energy available during a failure; it 
only considered the pneumatic energy of the 10% by volume ullage space. 
• There was no blast/fragmentation or QD siting analysis of barrier capabilities, plywood, 
or door. 
• The Test Team accepted the manufacturer's CPV structural analysis without sufficient 
review. 
• The manufacturer of the tank maintained it would fail by a Leak Before Burst scenario 
without supporting evidence, as did the test team in its Test Readiness Review. 
-
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Orbiter COPV Processing Risk Management 
John F. Kennedy Space Center ---------------------
• COPVs on the Shuttle Orbiter were Kevlar/Epoxy overwrapped, with one graphite Epoxy COPV. 
• Based on the Orbiter COPV working group stress rupture risk calculations for Orbiter COPVs, 
COPV Stress Rupture became a top Shuttle program risk. Significant changes were made to 
reduce the ground processing risk to personnel : 
- Modified pressurization of COPVs to limit temperature and fiber stress 
- The pad was cleared during COPV pressurization 
-
- The KSC COPV Safety Bulletin limiting pad access to essential personnel from L-4 to launch 
was broadcast through out KSC 
- Several COPVs from Orbiters with highest stress rupture risk were replaced 
- Reduced OMS flight pressures for remaining flights 
- WSTF performed burst and stress rupture tests of existing Orbiter COPVs and blast 
analysis 
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Orbiter COPV risk from 10/18/2007 PRCB 
John F. Kennedy Space Center ---------------------------
Presenter. 
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ISS Program COPV Processing Risk Management 
John F. Kennedy Space Center ------------------
• COPVs used on the ISS Element and in ISS Experiments are primarily 
Graphite Epoxy Composite Overwrapped: 
- ISS Element COPVs include Nitrogen Tank Assembly (NTA}, High 
Pressure Gas Tank (HPGT}, and Plasma Contactor Unit (PCU} 
- ISS Experiment COPVs include Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer 
(AMS-2}, SPACEDRUMS (Space Dynamically Responding 
Ultrasonic Matrix System}, JAXA Gas Bottle Assembly (GBU}, 
Verification Gas Assembly (VGA}, and Vehicle Cabin Atmosphere 
Monitor ( VCAM} 
• COPVs for the Nitrogen Oxygen Recharge System (NORS} are in the 
qualification phase. They were designed to ISO requirements, and 
have received a DOT Special Permit for transportation of pressurized 
COPVs. 
• At KSC, ISS COPVs were remotely pressurized in an offline blast 
resistant facility. The primary ground processing risk to personnel 
was during processing in the SSPF and pad once pressurized. 
-
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Carbon COPV Reliability 
John F. Kennedy Space Center ------------------------
-
• The NESC COPV Working Group was asked to determine the probability of COPV stress 
rupture for ISS ground processing and ISS flight operations, but due to the limited Graphite 
strand and vessel test data available at the time, the results of this analysis were 
problematic. 
"All NASA programs that use COPVs have the same basic issue: We do not have a 
way to adequately quantify (graphite ) COPV risk with current data and models. " 
"The failure mechanism associated with stress rupture is complex, not well 
understood, and is difficult to accurately predict or detect prior to failure" 
• To address this problem, NASA currently has an extensive COPV test program underway 
at WSTF to determine carbon COPV reliability. 
300 Carbon subscale COPVs manufactured by General Dynamics 
Burst Testing complete 
Sub-scale test program is on-schedule to meet NORS flight needs 
A full scale COPV testing program is being evaluated which will reduce conservatism in 
reliability calculations and verify modeling assumptions 
- Flight-quality COPVs have better manufacturing process 
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Nitrogen Tank Assembly 
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ISS COPV Ground Processing Risk Reduction 
John F. Kennedy Space Center --------------------
• Risk Reduction for ISS COPV ground processing was accomplished through multiple 
steps: 
- Revised mission processing operations to minimize pressurized COPV exposure 
time 
- ISS COPV Tracking Matrix 
- Generate ISS COPV Mechanical Damage Control Plans to control impact damage 
- ISS COPV Blast/fragmentation Damage Analysis by WSTF 
- Personnel COPV Risk Education and Imposing Access Restrictions for 
Pressurized COPVs in the SSPF and Pad based on the COPV blast analysis 
- Adherence to KNPR 8715.3 Safety requirements for ground processing of COPVs 
- Followed the guidelines in ES4-09-031 NASA Carbon Overwrapped Pressure 
Vessel (COPV) Pressure Restrictions 
• Maintain the operating strain in the fiber below 50 % of ultimate fiber strain during ground 
pressurization, integration and flight operations. 
• Pressurize the COPV as late in the flow as possible to minimize ground personnel exposure time. 
-
• Label the COPVs to prevent damage, report any inadvertent damage, maintain safety clears around 
pressurized COPVs ( above 1/3 design burst) based on blast/fragmentation analysis. 
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COPV Tracking Matrix 
John F. Kennedy Space Center -------------------
• To better understand and assess the safety risk of processing the 
various ISS COPVs, KSC Safety developed the ISS COPV Tracking 
Matrix. 
- It contains data on each ISS COPV at KSC such as 
COPV liner material, fiber, resin, fill pressure, MOP, minimum 
design burst, volume, max fill/burst pressure, dimensions, 
associated mission, last fill date, MDCP hyperlink, TNT equivalent, 
restricted access radius, etc. 
• Data in the ISS COPV Tracking Matrix was used for risk assessments 
and as a decision making tool. 
-
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ISS COPV Mechanical Damage Control Plans 
John F. Kennedy Space Center ----------------
• To address the COPV impact damage failure mode, Mechanical Damage 
Control Plans were written and implemented for all ISS COPVs. 
• The NASA Fracture Control Board Chairman issued a COPV Damage Control 
Plan template document to supplement the requirements in 
ANSI/AIAA S-081 and KNPR 8715.3. 
• ISS COPV Mechanical Damage Control Plans established procedures to 
prevent impact damage to COPVs during manufacturing, shipping, KSC 
processing and handling, and installation into ISS systems. 
• ISS COPV Mechanical Damage Control Plans are now reviewed and 
approved as part of the ISS Ground Safety Review Panel process and by 
the NASA Pressure Vessel & Fracture Control Technical Monitor. 
-
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COPV Inspection at KSC 
John F. Kennedy Space Center -----------------
• Per KNPR 8715.3 section 13.18.1 GRAPHITE/EPOXY (Gr/Ep)COMPOSITE 
OVERWRAPPED PRESSURE VESSELS (COPVs) 
c. Prior to the first pressurization of Gr/Ep COPVs at the KSC, CCAFS, VAFB or 
Dryden, an inspection of the vessel for visible damage shall be performed by a 
trained inspector. 
Trained Inspector: (COPV) A person trained specifically in the detection of visual 
damage of COPVs and familiarized with the NDE methods and results that could 
be used to aid in the interpretation of visual damage. White Sands Test Facility 
typically conducts this training as part of their COPV damage control and 
inspection course. 
• At KSC for ISS COPV processing, COPV inspection is provided by NASA QA 
personnel with WSTF COPV inspection training. 
-
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COPV Rupture Consequence 
WSTF Blast/Fragmentation Analysis 
John F. Kennedy Space Center ----------------------- -
• KSC assessed the COPY stress rupture consequence based on the Chris Keddy WSTF ISS COPY 
blast/fragmentation analysis report (Examination of Catastrophic Failure of COPYs During 
Ground Operations: KSC SSPF Flight ULF-3 2009) 
- Primary COPY rupture effects as well as some secondary effects were considered 
• Below is a ISS COPY blast overpressure result using the PY HAZARD software 
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Personnel Education and Access Restrictions for Pressurized 
ISS COPVs 
John F. Kennedy Space Center ---------------------
• All Space Station Processing Facility (SSPF) residents are notified of the 
presence of pressurized COPVs and the associated hazards. 
• Personnel access restrictions around pressurized COPVs in the SSPF were 
based on the WSTF ISS COPV blast fragmentation analysis report 
overpressure curves at 3psi. 
-
• Personnel access restricted zones in the SSPF for pressurized HPGT and NTA 
are shown below RESTRICTICN ZONE 
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SSPF Access Restrictions around Pressurized 
COPVs 
John F. Kennedy Space Center ------------------
-
• COPV restricted areas in SSPF processing area with warning signage 
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SSPF Access Restrictions around Pressurized 
COPVs 
John F. Kennedy Space Center -----------------
-
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KNPR 8715.3 COPV processing requirements 
John F. Kennedy Space Center ----------------------
• 13.18 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR DESIGN, TEST, AND GROUND PROCESSING OF FLIGHT 
COMPOSITE OVERWRAPPED PRESSURE VESSELS (COPVS) AT THE KENNEDY SPACE 
CENTER (KSC), CAPE CANAVERAL AIR FORCE STATION (CCAFS), AND THE VANDENBERG 
AIR FORCE BASE (V AFB) 
Summarizing 
• Prior to the first pressurization of COPVs at KSC (or last time COPV was accessible), an inspection of the 
vessel for visible damage shall be performed by a trained inspector. 
• Following visual inspection, COPV shall be pressure tested to 1.1 times the ground maximum operating 
pressure. (If the COPV is shipped pressurized to KSC, this requirement is usually waived.). ( This requirement 
is being considered for deletion) 
• The 1.1 test or any pressurization above 1/3 design burst pressure shall be performed remotely or a blast 
shield shall be used to protect personnel 
• Personnel limits for operations around COPVs above 1/3 design burst pressure shall be established (based on 
a COPV blast effects analysis). 
• The transport of pressurized COPVs at pressures greater than 1/3 design burst pressure shall be along routes 
that minimize exposure to personnel and facilities with escort during designated "off-shift" time periods. 
• A Mechanical Damage Control Plan (MDCP) for each COPV shall be provided by the design agency and made 
available for review by the Ground Safety Review Panel, the NASA Pressure Vessel Technical Monitor, and the 
KSC ISS operations and engineering department prior to operations. 
-
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Future ISS Program COPVs 
John F. Kennedy Space Center --------------------
Nitrogen Oxygen Recharge System ( NORS) 
• 35-150 NORS COPVs will be pressurized and processed for launch on 
multiple ISS resupply vehicles to resupply oxygen and nitrogen to ISS 
for Crew metabolic needs & emergency medical usage 
Extravehicular Activity (EVA) 
Maintaining normal atmospheric pressure 
Contingency module repressurization 
Payload usage 
Thermal Control System 
• The NORS baseline is: 
COPV design to meet ISO/DOT requirements with a FOS of 3.4 
DOT Special Permit to allow shipping fully pressurized COPVs from KSC to 
launch sites {CCAFS, Wallops, and Tanegashima) 
Pressurization to flight pressures at KSC 
NORS to be launched on SPACEX, Orbital Cygnus, and HTV 
NORS COPV Mechanical Damage Control plan has been developed as part of 
the COPV design process 
-
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NORS COPV Pressurization at KSC 
John F. Kennedy Space Center ------------------ -
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Standards with Requirements for Flight Pressure Vessels 
John F. Kennedy Space Center ------------------
• AIAA S-080 Space Systems - Metallic Pressure Vessels, Pressurized 
Structures, and Pressure Components 
• ANSI/AIAA S-081 Space Systems- Composite Overwrapped Pressure 
Vessels (COPVs) 
• Proposed Draft AIAA- S-082 -Composite Pressure Vessels (no liner) 
• Draft BSRIAIAA S-089 American National Standard Space Systems -
Composite Pressurized Structure (CPS) 
• Note we are proposing adding ground processing requirements to the 
above AIAA standards, which will be discussed at the AIAA working 
group meeting. 
• The KSC Safety Practices Procedural Requirements KNPR 8715.3 
COPV ground processing requirements section will be revised to 
address the 4 types of flight pressure vessels listed above. 
• AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND MANUAL (AFSPCMAN) 91-710, Range 
Safety User Requirements 
• NASA-STD 8719.24 NASA EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE PAYLOAD 
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
-
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Summary 
John F. Kennedy Space Center -----------------
• COPVs are used in NASA and Air Force spaceflight programs . 
• All COPV failure modes/ Hazard causes should be addressed in the 
associated COPV safety analysis with recommended mitigations and 
controls. 
• The Shuttle Program addressed the risks associated with COPVs and put 
practical mitigations in place to significantly reduce the ground risk. 
• The ISS Program assessed COPV ground processing risks and KSC has 
implemented procedures to reduce ground processing risk in accordance 
with the NASA guidelines. 
- . 
• Ground processing safety requirements for all types of Composite Pressure 
Vessels should be incorporated in NASA and industry standards. ( This topic 
will be discussed in the AIAA working Group meeting later this week) 
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John F. Kennedy Space Center 
Backup 
Definition of BLEVE 
John F. Kennedy Space Center -----------------
-
• BLEVE definition from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 
• BLEVE (pronounced /BLEV-ee), is an acronym for Boiling Liquid Expanding 
Vapor Explosion. 
• Mechanism 
- If a vessel partly filled with liquid with vapor above filling the remainder of 
the container, is ruptured, the vapor portion may rapidly leak, lowering 
the pressure inside the container. This sudden drop in pressure inside 
the container causes violent boiling of the liquid, which rapidly liberates 
large amounts of vapor. The pressure of this vapor can be extremely 
high, causing a significant wave of overpressure (an explosion) which 
may completely destroy the storage vessel and project fragments over 
the surrounding area. 
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Definition of Stress Rupture 
John F. Kennedy Space Center -----------------
• Dr. Leigh Phoenix I Cornell University provided this definition of COPV 
stress rupture 
-
• ptr~ess rupture is a sudden failure mode for Composite Overwrapped 
Pressure Vessels (COPVs) that can occur at normal operating pressures and 
temperatures. This failure mode can occur while at stress levels below 
ultimate strength for extended time. The failure mechanism is complex, not 
well understood, and is difficult to accurately predict or detect prior to failure. 
The location and mechanism of triggering damage causing sudden failure is 
highly localized, but at a random location. This location and extent of local 
damage has not been able to be detected by current Nondestructive 
Evaluation (NDE) techniques prior to catastrophic failure. Pressure, duration 
of time at pressure, and temperature experienced contribute to the 
degradation of the fiber and/or the fiber-matrix interface, particularly around 
accumulations of fiber breaks, and these increase the probability of COPV 
stress rupture. 
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